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Abstract: This paper studies how foreign direct investment (FDI) affects innovation in the host 
country, using matched firm-level patent data of Chinese firms. The data contain 
multidimensional information about patent counts and citations which, together with an 
identification strategy based on Lu et al. (2017), allows us to measure innovation 
comprehensively and to uncover the causal relationship. Our empirical analysis shows that FDI 
has positive intra-industry effects on the quantity and quality of innovation by Chinese firms. 
We show that these positive effects are driven by increases in competition, rather than by 
knowledge spillover from FDI which is measured by patent citations between domestic firms 
and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). We further investigate the inter-industry effects of FDI 
and find that FDI has positive vertical effects on innovation in upstream sectors. 
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One of the kernel intentions for developing countries to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is to promote the growth of domestic industries by absorbing foreign investors’ advanced 
technology. A considerable body of research has examined FDI’s impact on productivity in 
developing countries, finding some evidence that the presence of FDI indeed facilitates 
technology transfer through spillovers and enhancements of domestic firms’ productivity (e.g., 
Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Javorcik, 2004; Kugler, 2006；Blalock and Gertler, 2008; 
Burstein and Monge-Naranjo, 2009).1 The long-term productivity growth of a country, however, 
depends also on the innovation of its domestic firms. Innovation will become increasingly 
important for many developing countries as they grow further and narrow the gap with the 
developed world (e.g., Chen and Puttitanum, 2005). With the continued rise of foreign direct 
investment to developing countries, an important question for both economists and policy 
makers is: How will FDI impact the innovation of host-country firms? 
From a theoretical perspective, the influx of FDI may either positively or negatively impact 
domestic firms’ innovation: while the potential knowledge spillover from advanced foreign 
firms is likely beneficial, the business stealing effect of increased competition may reduce 
domestic firms’ innovation (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; Bloom et al., 2019). Empirical research 
on the relationship between FDI and innovation is relatively sparse. The few existing studies 
for developed countries have produced mixed results.2 Studies for developing countries have 
focused on China (Hu and Jefferson, 2009; Cheung and Lin, 2004; Zhang, 2017). As the largest 
developing country, China has in the past few decades experienced large increases in both FDI 
and innovation (Figure 1), providing a natural setting for research that has broad implications 
for developing countries. These studies find a positive relationship between FDI and innovation 
 
1 However, as indicated by Havranek and Irsova (2011), results vary broadly across methods and countries. 
Some studies have also found negative effects of FDI on firms’ productivity (e.g., Haddad and Harrison, 
1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999).  
2 García et al. (2013) find that FDI inflows into Spain are negatively associated with the ex-post innovation 
of local manufacturing firms, whereas Crescenzi et al. (2015) find that domestic firms in sectors with more 
FDI have stronger innovative performance in the UK. 
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in China, but their measurement of innovation is largely limited to patent counts and lacks 
quality metrics that account for the heterogeneity in patent quality. More importantly, these 
studies primarily contain correlation results, without adequately addressing potential problems 
associated with omitted variables and reverse causality. This issue is especially concerning in 
light of the surprising finding of Lu et al. (2017). Using a novel identification strategy, Lu et 
al. (2017) find evidence that inward FDI negatively impacts Chinese firms’ productivity. One 
wonders whether FDI may also negatively affect Chinese firms’ innovation once the causal 
relationship is identified. 
This paper conducts an empirical study of inward FDI’s impact on Chinese firms’ 
innovation, using new firm-level matched data on firms’ operations and patents in China.3 The 
newly available data set on patent applications by Chinese firms allows us to construct 
comprehensive measures of firms’ innovation quantity and quality, including patent counts and 
patent citations, using the methodology in the innovation literature (e.g., Hall et al., 2001, 2005). 
Following the identification strategy put forward by Lu et al. (2017), we further construct an 
instrument for FDI that utilizes a plausibly exogenous change of FDI regulations in China, the 
revisions to the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries in 2002. We are 
then able to compare firms’ innovation performance between the treatment group (i.e., FDI-
encouraged industries) and the control group (i.e., FDI-unchanged industries) before and after 
the changes in FDI regulation. Our research thus overcomes the two main difficulties in the 
existing studies on FDI and innovation, namely the comprehensive measurement of innovation 
and the identification of a causal relationship. 
We find positive intra-industry effects of FDI on firms’ innovation quantity and quality, 
measured respectively by the number of patents and by patent citations (number, generality, 
and originality). Moreover, the positive impact of FDI appears to be more pronounced for more 
important innovations (i.e., for invention patents than for utility model and design patents). 
Further evidence backs up these positive effects when considering “radical innovation”. The 
 
3As discussed in more detail later, we merge the firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 




results remain valid with respect to various robustness tests, including the addition of multiple 
controls. The comprehensive data further allow us to examine the possible mechanisms for 
FDI’s effects. In particular, based on the patent citations made by domestic firms to foreign 
invested enterprises (FIEs), we construct a direct measurement of knowledge spillover from 
FDI, and we quantify competition intensity not only through market concentration but also 
through a measure of technology competition using the patent data. We find evidence that the 
influx of FDI intensifies market competition and pressures domestic firms in the same industry 
to innovate for technological upgrades, leading to an overall positive impact, but no evidence 
of a significant horizontal knowledge spillover effect of FDI on firm innovation. This is 
surprising, in contrast to the finding of Lu et al. (2017) that FDI has negative competition but 
positive spillover effects on firm productivity. The competition and spillover effects of FDI for 
innovation and for productivity can thus be very different.4 Furthermore, we find that the 
effects of FDI on innovation are heterogenous across different types of domestic firms. 
Specifically, the effects are smaller for larger firms and for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
and they are larger for firms less distanced from the technology frontier. 
FDI can also potentially affect innovation through vertical linkages. We find that the 
presence of FDI in downstream sectors has positive effects on the innovation of firms in the 
upstream industries, whereas the presence of FDI in upstream sectors has negative effects on 
the innovation of downstream firms. The literature has suggested that vertical knowledge 
spillover is a major source of the vertical effects of FDI on productivity (Javorcik, 2004; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008; Blalock and Gertler, 2008), but it does not separately identify 
the knowledge spillover. Our comprehensive patent data allow us to construct direct measures 
of both backward and forward knowledge spillovers, based on the patent citation network. We 
demonstrate that there are significant knowledge spillovers through backward but not forward 
linkages which, together with other factors in vertical relations, provide explanations to the 
different effects of backward and forward FDI on Chinese firms’ innovation. 
 
4 Productivity may depend more than innovation on factors such as sales, know-how, and management 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data for our study 
and also provides some institutional background. Section 3 presents the identification strategy 
and the underlying assumptions. Section 4 reports the main empirical results on the (intra-
industry) effects of FDI on innovation, explains the results by analyzing the potential 
competition and knowledge spillover mechanisms, and further examines the heterogeneity of 
the innovation effects of FDI. Section 5 conducts additional analysis, using various controls 
and considering alternative assumptions, to confirm the robustness of our main results. Section 
6 examines the vertical effects of FDI and the underlying mechanisms of backward vs. forward 
knowledge spillovers. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Data 
First, this section describes our constructions of a firm-level panel data set and a patent 
data set of Chinese firms. We then describe the process of matching these two data sets. 
Measures of innovation are then discussed. Finally, we describe the (exogenous) changes in 
FDI regulations to be considered for our analysis. 
2.1. Firm-level panel data 
We construct annual firm-level data for the 1998–2007 period that cover all firms, 
including SOEs and non-SOEs, based on the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). Firms in the ASIF data account 
for around 95% of total Chinese industrial output and 98% of total Chinese industrial exports 
(Tan and Peng, 2003), spanning 37 two-digit manufacturing industries and 31 provinces or 
province-equivalent municipal cities. In 2003, a new classification system for industry codes 
(GB/T 4754-2002) was adopted in China to replace the old classification system (GB/T 4754-
1994) that had been used from 1995 to 2002. Following the concordance table constructed by 
Brandt et al. (2012), we link the two classifications and develop consistency in the industry 
codes over our entire sample period (1998–2007). To further clean the sample, we implement 
screening to remove potentially problematic observations. As in Cai et al. (2018), we drop 
observations where firm identifiers, county code, sector ID, or year of establishment are 
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missing, as well as observations that have total sales below 5 million RMB or fewer than eight 
employees. Additionally, observations are dropped if total assets are less than liquid assets or 
total fixed assets. Since we are interested in the impact of FDI on domestic firms, we exclude 
from our sample all foreign firms (i.e., any firm with more than 25% of its equity owned by 
foreign investors, according to China’s Foreign Investment Law). 
2.2. Patent data 
The Chinese patent data for our study, obtained from the China National Intellectual 
Property Administration (CNIPA), cover all published patent applications since 1985 when 
CNIPA started to accept patent applications. The data contain all the records of patent 
applications and approvals as of June 2017, including around 6.77 million invention patents, 
6.26 million utility model patents, and 4.17 million design patents. We divide the information 
of each patent into three parts: (1) Patent information: patent name, application number, 
application date, publishing number, publishing date, and International Patent Classification 
(IPC). (2) Applicant information: Applicant’s name, applicant’s address, applicant’s ZIP code, 
and applicant’s country (or province). (3) Patent rights information: inventor’s name, priority 
number, priority day, agent, agency, legal status information, summary, claim book, and citation 
information. 
2.3. Data matching 
Based on the matching methodology in He et al. (2018), we match the ASIF data and the 
patent data for Chinese firms. The assignee names of Chinese patents are matched to the names 
of manufacturing firms through exact matching, approximate matching, and manual checks. 
Details are reported in Appendix B. After the matching procedures, we merge the aggregate 
patent data to the ASIF data set at a firm-year level. 
2.4. Innovation measures 
Patent counts are widely used as a basic measure of innovation (Hall et al., 2001). This 
study uses four metrics to capture patent counts: number of all patents, number of invention 
patents, number of utility model patents, and number of design patents. We further use another 
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set of metrics to gauge the quality of patents: the number of citations a patent receives following 
its approval, the generality index, and the originality index. The number of citations a patent 
receives is a direct measure of its importance. A patent that cites a broader array of technology 
classes is viewed as having greater originality, while a patent that is cited by a more 
technologically varied array of patents is viewed as having greater generality (Trajtenberg et 
al., 1997). Specifically, the originality and the generality of a patent is measured respectively 
by the Herfindahl index of the patents it cites and the Herfindahl index of its citing patents. 
Because citation rates and patent counts vary over time and across technologies (e.g., using 
a patent’s citation number to measure its innovation quality could have the bias of favoring 
earlier rather than later patents), we will define scaled variables that adjust for such variations. 
Specifically, following Hall et al. (2001), we scale the innovation measures by IPC technology 
class and year. A technology class is a detailed classification of International Patent 
Classification. We use IPC one-digit figure as the technology class. To compute a scaled 
measure, we divide the measure by the average value of the measure in the same year and 
technology class. This allows us to obtain scaled number of patents, scaled citations, scaled 
generality, and scaled originality. We will use the scaled measures to conduct robustness checks 
for our results. 
2.5. FDI and its regulations in China 
FIEs virtually did not exist in China before its reform and opening-up in 1978. After the 
Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures was passed in 1979, a series of laws and regulations 
were enacted to attract FDI, accompanied by various policies such as tax reduction, land usage, 
and subsidies. Among the regulations concerning FDI, Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign 
Investment Industries (henceforth, the Catalogue) is the most important one, becoming the 
government’s guidelines for regulating the inflows of FDI in 1997. To comply with China’s 
commitments for entry to the WTO, China substantially revised the Catalogue in March 2002 
(China also revised the Catalogue in November 2004, but only with minor revisions). As 
proposed by Lu et al. (2017), the substantial changes in the Catalogue can be considered as 
exogenous, because China’s WTO accession was commonly regarded as exogenous and the 
 
8 
revisions of the Catalogue in 2002 were part of China’s agreement on WTO’s accession. In this 
study, we use the plausibly exogenous changes in FDI regulations (i.e., changes in the 
Catalogue) to identify the effects of FDI on domestic firms’ innovation. 
To obtain information about changes in FDI regulations, we first identify whether there 
was a change in the FDI policies for each product in the Catalogue, where products were 
classified into four categories: (1) FDI is encouraged; (2) FDI is permitted; (3) FDI is restricted; 
(4) FDI is prohibited. We compare the 1997 and 2002 versions of the Catalogue and classify 
each product into one of three possible outcomes: (1) FDI became more welcome; (2) FDI 
became less welcome; (3) no change in FDI regulation. 
We next aggregate the changes in FDI policies for individual products at the industry level. 
We use the Industrial Product Catalogue to map the product-level classifications of the 
Catalogue into the four-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) of 2003. Following this 
aggregation process, all the four-digit CIC industries are classified into four categories: (1) FDI 
encouraged industry; (2) FDI discouraged industry; (3) FDI no change industries; (4) mixed 
industry. The detailed classification process is listed in Appendix C. 
From the data classification process above, 117 four-digit CIC industries are classified as 
the FDI encouraged industries; 297 are FDI unchanged industries; five are FDI discouraged 
industries, and six are FDI mixed industries.5 The latter two groups are excluded from the 
analysis. 
3. Estimation Strategy 
In this section, we first describe our econometric specification, followed by a discussion 
of the validity of our identification strategy. 
 
5 In Lu et al. (2017), 112 are FDI encouraged industries, 300 are FDI no change industries, seven are FDI 
discouraged industries, and five are FDI mixed industries. While we follow the same procedure as theirs, 
our classification of the industries is slightly different, reflecting some small difference in the subjective 
judgement of assigning an industry to one of the four categories. Our regression results are robust with 
respect to this difference. 
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3.1. Econometric specification 
To study the impact of FDI on firms’ innovation, we estimate the following benchmark 
model: 
 
0 _fit it fit f t fitInnovation FDI Industry          X . (1) 
where 
fitInnovation is the innovation performance of firm f  in four-digit industry i  and year 
t , measured respectively by the number of all patents, the number of invention patents, the 
number of utility model patents, the number of design patents, the number of patent citations, 
generality, and originality. 
fitX  is a vector of time-varying firm and industry characteristics, 
including firms’ output, firms’ capital labor ratio, firms’ export status, and a dummy variable 
indicating whether a firm is an SOE. The summary statistics of the main variables are presented 
in Table 1. The firm and year fixed effects and the constant term are denoted respectively by 


















fitOutput   measures the output of firm f   in industry i   in year t  . _ fitFDI Firm   is 
defined as firms’ foreign equity share. it   is the set of firms in industry i   in year t  . 
_ itFDI Industry  is an industry level FDI variable that captures the presence of FDI in industry 
i  in year t . Innovation metrics are likely to be autocorrelated over time. Thus, we allow the 
standard errors to have arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by clustering standard 
errors at firm-level (Blanco and Wehrheim, 2017). 
Our specific interest lies in  , the parameter that captures the effects of FDI on innovation 
of firms in the same sector. A positive value of   indicates that the presence of FDI has positive 
intra-industry effects on firms’ innovation. To obtain an unbiased estimate of    in the 
benchmark model, an important assumption is that, conditional on all of the control variables, 
the regressor _ itFDI Industry  is uncorrelated with the error term. However, there are concerns 
that this assumption might be violated. For example, the more innovative firms are likely to be 
in industries that attract more FDI. 
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To tackle the identification problem, we use variation across industries in the change of 
FDI regulation as an instrument for _ itFDI Industry  to identify the impact of FDI on the 
innovation of Chinese firms, following Lu et al. (2017) in their study of FDI’s effects on 
productivity. Specifically, we compare firm innovation performance in the treatment group (i.e., 
FDI encouraged industries) with firm innovation performance in the control group (i.e., FDI 
no change industries) before and after the implementation of the Catalogue in 2002. This is an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation based on a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy. The 
first stage of the IV estimation is 
 
0_ 02it i t fit f t fitFDI Industry Treatment Post           X   (2) 
where iTreatment  indicates whether industry i  belongs to the treatment group; and 02tPost  is 
a dummy indicating the period after implement of Catalogue 2002, namely 
02 1  2002,  02 3 / 4  2002,   02 0  2002t t tPost if t Post if t and Post if t      .6  
3.2. Validity of DID based instrumental variable 
The above DID based instrument is valid under two conditions. First, the relevance 
condition: the share of FDI increased more in the encouraged industries than in the no change 
industries. This relevance condition is confirmed by the significance of   in Equation (2), 
which is shown in Panel B in Table 2. 
Second, the instrument should also satisfy the exclusion restriction condition. That is, 
variations across industries from the change in FDI regulation do not affect firms’ innovative 
behavior through channels other than the share of FDI. Specifically, conditional on all the 
controls, our instrumental variable 02i tTreatment Post  is uncorrelated with the error term 
fit  in Equation (1), namely  cov 02 , | 0i t fit fitTreatment Post  W  , where fitW  summates 
all of the controls in the regression. Since our instrument is DID based, there are only two 
possible sources of violation of this identifying assumption:  cov 02 , | 0t fit fitPost  W  or 
 cov , | 0i fit fitTreatment  W . 
 
6 02 3 / 4tPost   for 2002 in our empirical analysis, as the Catalogue 2002 was implemented on April 1, 
2002. The results (available upon request)  remain robust when 02 1tPost   for 2002. 
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One concern is that the post-treatment period indicator 02tPost  and the second-stage 
error term 
fit  are possibly correlated when the timing of the FDI regulation change was non-
random. However, the regulation revision in 2002 resulted from a lengthy negotiation between 
China and 150 WTO member countries upon China’s accession into WTO. Since the result of 
the negotiation was uncertain prior to 2001, the timing of FDI regulation change in 2002 was 
plausibly random and Chinese firms would not have anticipated the change of FDI regulations 
in 2002. Nevertheless, to deal with the possible non-random selection of timing, we control for 
other ongoing policy reforms during that time that might affect our results. Since one crucial 
policy reform in the early 2000s was the privatization of SOEs, in a similar way to Lu et al. 
(2017), we add the interaction between year dummies and industry SOE share in 2001 into 
fitX . We also include the year fixed effects, which controls for all the macro shocks that might 
have correlated with the timing of FDI regulations in China. 
Another concern is that the treatment status iTreatment  and the second-stage error term 
fit  might be correlated, which would mean that the selection of FDI encouraged industries 
upon China’s accession to WTO is non-random. To alleviate this concern, we control for the 
potential factors that might affect the selection of the treatment group. First, following 
Gentzkow (2006), we carefully characterize the potential determinants, 1998iZ , of the changes 
in FDI regulations upon the WTO accession. We identify three determinants at the four-digit 
industry level: new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms (Appendix 
Table A1). We then add interactions between t  and these three determinants 1998iZ  in fitX  to 
control for the plausible predeterminants of the selection of industries for the change in FDI 
regulation. Second, we also control for time-varying firm characteristics in 
fitX  that might 
affect the selection of our treatment group, including firms’ output, firms’ capital–labor ratio, 
firms’ ownership structure, and firms’ export status. 
4. Effects of FDI on Innovation 
This section presents our results on how FDI inflows impact firms’ innovation in China. 
Subsection 4.1 contains our main results, concerning how FDI impacts the quantity and quality 
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of innovation by firms within the same industry. Subsection 4.2 provides further evidence on 
the impact of FDI on the quality of innovation by considering radical innovation.  Subsection 
4.3 explains the mechanisms behind our main results. The heterogeneity of the innovation 
effects of FDI is explored in subsection 4.4.7 
4.1. Main results 
For the dependent variable in our regressions in this subsection, we use in turn: (i) the 
number of all patents of a firm to measure innovation quantity; (ii) the numbers of invention 
patents, utility model patents, and design patents each as an additional innovation measure; (iii) 
the number of citations, the generality, and the originality of patents of a firm to measure 
innovation quality. 
The distribution of patent measures in the pooled sample is right-skewed, with 
approximately the 95th percentile of the distribution being zero. We tackle this problem of the 
dependent variable with two methods. First, the natural logarithm of each innovation measure 
is used. To avoid losing firm-year observations with zero patents or citations per patent, we add 
one to the actual values when calculating the natural logarithm (Liu et al., 2021). Second, 
following Hu et al. (2017), we take the original innovation measures as dependent variables 
and use the conditional fixed effects Poisson model, in which the zero value of an innovation 
measure is replaced with the logarithm of 0.01. 
 Table 2 reports the baseline results of estimating Equation (1). The results in columns (1)–
(3) come from the 2SLS (two stage least square) estimation. In column (1), we control for firm 
and year fixed effects, as well as the interactions between year dummies and FDI regulation 
determinants. The result of the second-stage regression shows that the impact of FDI is positive 
and both economically and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that a 10 
percentage points increase in FDI leads to a 0.41% increase in the number of all patents. The 
first-stage estimation shows that the instrument 02i tTreatment Post   has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on _ itFDI Industry  , confirming that the relaxation of FDI 
 
7 While our main analysis concerns the intra-industry effects of FDI, we will also study the vertical effects 
of FDI later in Section 6. 
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regulations triggers inflows of FDI. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (2700.857) is much 
larger than the critical value at the 10% significance level (Stock and Yogo, 2005), rejecting 
the null hypothesis that our IV for FDI is subject to the weak IV problem.  
In column (2), we add interactions between year dummies and SOE share to control for 
the privatization of SOEs. The coefficient of the second-stage regression shows that the impact 
of FDI on patent counts is statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (3), we further 
control for firm characteristics. The coefficient of the second-stage regression again shows that 
the impact of FDI on patent counts is statistically significant at 1%, implying that the number 
of all patents rises by 3% after increasing FDI by ten percentage points. The results reported in 
column (4) come from a conditional fixed effects Poisson estimation. After being instrumented, 
this model shows that FDI consistently generates a positive and statistically significant effect 
on the number of all patents. 
In column (5), we further report the reduced-form estimation results. The estimated 
coefficient of the instrumental variable is positive and statistically significant, consistent with 
our aforementioned findings. In column (6), we present the OLS estimation results, which 
shows the impact of FDI is negative but not statistically significant. There can be a severe 
endogenous problem in OLS estimations, such as the issues of omitted variables and reverse 
causality. 
We next investigate whether the positive effect of FDI on innovation varies for different 
categories of patents. There are three categories of patent in China: invention patents, utility 
model patents, and design patents. The invention patent corresponds to a more substantial 
invention due to its requirement of novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability. The 
utility model patent requires that some significant improvement be made to an existing product. 
The design patent is more about some modification to the product appearance. 
With the number of each of these three categories of patents as the dependent variable, 
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The estimated coefficient in column (1) shows that FDI 
exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on invention patents. As for the magnitude, 
a ten percentage points increase in FDI results in invention patents increasing by 0.35%. The 
Poisson estimation result in column (2) further supports the positive effect. The estimation 
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results in columns (3) and (4) show that there is no statistically significant impact of FDI on 
utility model patents. The estimated coefficients in columns (5) and (6) show that FDI has a 
positive impact on design patents but the relationship is not statistically significant. Together, 
these results show that the inflows of FDI benefit the more innovative invention patents, 
compared with the less innovative utility model and design patents. 
We next examine the impact of FDI on the quality of innovation, measured respectively 
by patent citations, generality, and originality. Table 4 reports our findings. The estimated 
coefficient for the 2SLS in column (1) shows that FDI has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the number of patent citations, and a ten percentage points increase in FDI leads to 
a 0.48% increase in the number of citations. The Poisson estimation in column (2) bears out 
this result. In addition, the 2SLS and Poisson estimation results for generality are reported in 
columns (3) and (4) respectively, indicating that FDI has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on generality. Moreover, the 2SLS and Poisson estimation results for originality are 
reported in columns (5) and (6) respectively, also indicating a positive and statistically 
significant impact. 
Overall, our baseline results show that FDI has a positive impact on firms’ innovation. On 
the one hand, FDI contributes to a significant increase in the quantity of innovation. In 
particular, the inflows of FDI exert a larger impact on the rise of invention patents, which are 
the most inventive patents, than on the growth of utility model and design patents. On the other 
hand, FDI leads to a noticeable improvement in the quality of innovation. It is also evident that, 
with the inflows of FDI, firms not only produce more influential patents but also generate more 
original patents. 
Finally, we use the seven scaled measures of innovation as dependent variables and run 
the regressions of the benchmark setting. In Table 5, columns (1)–(7) report the 2SLS 
estimation results. We find that the estimated coefficients are qualitatively the same after 
scaling the innovation measures. Specifically, the inflows of FDI still have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on both the scaled measures of innovation quantity and on the 
scaled measures of innovation quality. Poisson estimation results in columns (8)–(14) are in 
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support of the above results, except that the coefficients in columns (13) and (14) are not 
statistically significant. 
4.2. Radical innovation 
The numbers of patents and patent citations are the most basic measures of innovation 
output in literature. However, these measures do not distinguish between breakthrough 
innovation and incremental innovation (e.g., Griliches, 1990). From our main results, FDI has 
a significant impact on invention patents but not on utility model patents or design patents, 
suggesting that the positive effects of FDI on innovation are more pronounced for more 
substantial innovations. Is this still true for innovations that break new technology ground, or 
“radical innovations”? This question has its independent interest, and the answer can provide 
further evidence on how FDI affects innovation in the quality dimension. We report our results 
below, considering in turn four alternative measures of radical innovation that have been used 
in the literature. 
Tail innovation. Following Acemoglu et al. (2014), let  fts p  denote the number of the 
patents of a firm that are above the 
thp  percentile of the distribution in year t  according to 
citations. Then, the tail innovation index is defined as: 








where p  should be greater than 50%. This is of course also equivalent to the ratio of the 
number of patents by firm f  in year t  with citations above the thp  percentile divided by the 
number of patents by firm f  in year t  with citations above the median (it is not defined for 
firms that have no patents with citations above the median). We assign two values to p , 99% 
and 95%. The results reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 show that the presence of FDI 
increases tail innovation significantly. 
Best patent. Enlighted by Bernstein (2015), the most cited patent for firm f  at year t  
can be regarded as the best patent which is unlikely to be affected by low-quality innovation 
activities. We then examine the generality and originality of the best patent since the number 
of the best patent is always 1 for innovative firms. The results reported in columns (3) and (4) 
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in Table 6 show that FDI has significantly positive effects on the generality and originality of 
the best patent. 
Breakthrough innovation. Following Balsmeier et al. (2017) and Guo et al. (2019), the 
breakthrough innovation is computed as the (natural logarithm of one plus) number of patents 
of a firm with citations in the top 5% (10%) in the distribution of citations, where the 
distribution is constructed with all the patents applied in the same technology class in the same 
year. The results reported in columns (5) and (6) in Table 6 show that the effects of FDI on 
breakthrough innovation are positive and statistically significant. 
New technology innovation. We construct new technology innovation as the (natural 
logarithm of one plus number of patents that is filed in technology classes previously unknown 
to the firm (Balsmeier et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2019). We make use of two technology class 
criteria: one-digit IPC code and three-digit IPC code. Columns (7) and (8) in Table 6 show that 
the effects of FDI on new technology innovation are also positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the inflows of FDI bring to firms entirely new innovation from other technology 
fields. 
Using four alternative measures of radical innovation, we find that the intra-industry 
impact of FDI is consistently positive and significant for radical innovation. This also 
reinforces the finding in our main results that the positive effects of FDI on innovation are more 
pronounced for more substantial innovations (represented by invention patents), relative to less 
substantial ones (represented by utility model patents and design patents).  
In the rest of the paper, in order to be concise, we focus on three innovation measures, 
including the number of all patents, the number of invention patents, and the number of patent 
citations, as dependent variables and report only the 2SLS estimation results. The estimation 
results using other innovation measures are available upon request. 
4.3. Examining the mechanisms: competition vs. spillovers 
So far, we have established that FDI causes increases in innovation quantity and quality 
for firms in the same sector. In principle, FDI can affect the innovation of host-country firms 
through two main channels: the competition effect and the knowledge spillover effect (e.g., 
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Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004). We next investigate these possible underlying 
economic mechanisms. 
4.3.1. Competition effect 
The entry of foreign rivals enhances competition in host country. The impact of 
competition on innovation is theoretically ambiguous (e.g., Bloom et al., 2019) and can exhibit 
an inverted-U shape (Aghion et al., 2005). While competition might discourage innovation by 
reducing the rents that reward new innovation (the business-stealing effect), it can also provide 
the competitive pressure that encourages innovation. 
Following Degryse and Ongena (2005), we measure product market competition intensity 
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The second-stage and first-stage results of 2SLS regression are reported in Table 7 and 
Appendix Table A2 Panel A, respectively. The results of column (1) in Table 7 show that the 
horizontal FDI increased product market competition significantly. The interactions between 
horizontal FDI and product market competition of columns (2)–(4) show that FDI inflows boost 
the quantity and quality of innovation through enhancing product market competition. 
Firms compete not only in the product market, but also in the technology space. When 
there are more competing technologies in the industry, a firm potentially has a higher 
innovation incentive for two reasons. First, a firm’s innovation may cannibalize its own existing 
technology, but a higher number of technologies in the industry (provided by other firms) 
weakens the firm’s incentive to avoid the cannibalization (e.g., Jungbauer et al., 2021). Second, 
more competing technologies may directly pressure the firm to increase innovation in order to 
stay competitive. Thus we also evaluate the competition effect of FDI on innovation through 
its impact on technology competition. 
We measure technology competition of a firm by the number of invention patents (taking 
the logarithm) on the market that are in the same three-digit IPC code, the same four-digit 
industry and the same year, weighted by the firm’s invention patent counts in that year 
(Jungbauer et al., 2021). The second-stage results of 2SLS regression are reported in Table 8, 
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and the first-stage estimation results are shown in Appendix Table A2 Panel B. In Table 8, the 
results in column (1) show that the presence of horizontal FDI does strengthen competition 
significantly. From columns (2)–(4), we find that the estimated coefficients of interactions 
between horizontal FDI and technology competition on three measures of innovation are 
positive and statistically significant, implying that FDI is able to stimulate innovation quantity 
and quality through increased technology competition. 
These findings indicate that the presence of FDI in China strengthens competition, both 
in product market and in technology, which in turn promotes innovation. This is consistent with 
the existing empirical evidence suggesting that competition typically increases innovation, 
especially in markets with an initially low level of competition (Shu and Steinwender, 2019).  
4.3.2. Horizontal knowledge spillovers 
Domestic firms may benefit from the presence of FDI through the knowledge spillovers 
of foreign entrants. Foreign parent firms have incentives to directly transfer knowledge to their 
affiliates in host countries. Meanwhile, local firms may learn from foreign entrants by 
observing, imitating, and reverse-engineering their new products and technology. Our unique 
patent citation data enable us to develop a direct and novel measure of the knowledge spillovers 
of FDI, which allows us to directly evaluate the knowledge spillovers of FDI on the firms in 
the same sector. 
Our patent data indicate the linkages of different patents through citations (i.e., a specific 
patent cites other patents or is cited by other patents), which reveals the source of knowledge. 
Thus, the patent citations allow us to directly measure the knowledge spillovers from FIEs to 
local firms. We construct metrics of knowledge spillovers based on the concept of citation 
network, following the methodology in the literature (Bloom et al., 2013; He, 2015; and 
Acemoglu et al., 2016). Specifically, we construct two variables,   fitHorizontal Spillover Dummy  
and   fitHorizontal Spillover Intensity , to measure the horizontal knowledge spillovers. Dependent 
variable   fitHorizontal Spillover Dummy  indicates whether a domestic firm cites any patent owned 
by FIEs, and   fitHorizontal Spillover Intensity  indicates the ratio of citations to patents owned by 
FIEs to all citations. The regression results reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 9 show that 
the coefficients of horizontal FDI are negative, but small in magnitude and statistically 
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insignificant. Therefore, there is no evidence for a significant knowledge spillover effect of 
horizontal FDI on Chinese firms’ innovation. 
4.3.3. Overall effect 
The combination of a positive competition effect and a negligible knowledge spillover 
effect within the sector explains the overall positive intra-industry effect of FDI on innovation. 
Intriguingly, Lu et al. (2017) demonstrate that FDI has a negative competition effect and a 
positive spillover effect, resulting in an overall negative intra-industry effect on Chinese firms’ 
productivity. Possibly, more intense competition due to FDI would reduce domestic firms’ 
revenue, and such business stealing has a stronger and more direct negative impact on 
productivity than on innovation. At the same time, there could be more ways for 
technology/knowledge transfers to affect productivity than to affect innovation. These 
differences might explain the different intra-industry effects of FDI on productivity and on 
innovation for Chinese firms. 
4.4. Heterogeneity of effects 
Our baseline analysis shows that inflows of FDI cause higher innovation by Chinese firms. 
Because firms differ in many dimensions, it is also interesting to learn whether the effect of 
FDI differs across firm types. We investigate the heterogeneous effects in this subsection and 
present the second-stage regression results of 2SLS in Table 10. The first-stage results are 
shown in Appendix Table A3. 
Firm size. We capture firm size with a dummy variable, 
fitSize , which equals 1 for large-
medium sized firms (firms with more than 300 employees and 20 million-yuan sales) and 
otherwise 0, in accordance with the Standards for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in 
China. The regression results are presented in Table 10 Panel A. The coefficients of FDI are 
still positive and statistically significant, but the coefficients of interaction terms are negative. 
This suggests that the positive effects of FDI on innovation are weaker for larger firms, contrary 
to the prior finding that small firms lack the necessary absorptive capacity to benefit from FDI 
spillovers (Girma, 2005). 
 
20 
Ownership. Lu et al. (2017) find that the effect of FDI on productivity differs for firms 
with different ownership structures. To see whether this is also the case with innovation, we 
add the dummy variable (which equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if not), 
fitSOE , and the 
interaction between SOE and fitted FDI. Table 10 Panel B shows that the impacts of FDI remain 
positive. The ownership of SOE has a positive and statistically significant effect on firm 
innovation, but it attenuates the positive effects of FDI on innovation. 
Alliance. Interfirm linkages or cooperative alliances may benefit firms by helping them, 
for example, develop new technology, improve technical skills, and explore innovative 
products (Dowling and McGee, 1994; Grenadier and Weiss, 1997). We define a dummy 
variable, 
fitAlliance , which indicates whether the firm has an alliance with foreign investment, 
and report the estimation results in Table 10 Panel C. We find that the impact of FDI on 
innovation remains positive. However, the coefficients of interaction terms are significantly 
negative, suggesting that alliance with foreign investment weakens the positive effect of FDI 
on firms’ innovation. Conceivably, a domestic firm that is not partnered with FDI has a stronger 
desire to innovate and to be more competitive. 
Technological distance. A domestic firm that is far from the technological frontier could 
benefit more from knowledge transfer but may also have less ability to learn. To investigate 
the possible role of technological distance, we follow Aghion et al. (2005) to construct the 
technological distance variable: 
  (  ) /  fit it fit itTechnological distance TFP maximum TFP TFP maximum  , 
where 
fitTFP  is the total factor productivity (TFP) of firm f  in industry i  in year t  , and 
 itTFP maximum  is the highest TFP level in industry i  in year t , where the TFP of a firm is 
calculated using the method from Ackerberg et al. (2015). The regression results in Table 10 
Panel D show that FDI still has a positive and significant effect on firm innovation. The 
coefficient of technological distance is positive, suggesting that being far from the 
technological frontier benefits a firm’s innovation, which is consistent with findings in the 
literature (e.g., Haskel et al., 2007). However, the coefficients of the interaction between FDI 
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and technological distance are negative, indicating that technological distance weakens the 
positive impact of FDI on innovation. Plausibly, firms closer to the technological frontier face 
more head-to-head competition with the FIEs and are more motivated to innovate by the 
competition from FIEs.  
5. Robustness Analysis  
In this section, we examine the robustness of our baseline regression results. In the first set 
of robustness tests, we add controls for several factors that might confound the relationship 
between FDI and innovation and address some additional empirical issues. In the second set of 
robustness tests, similar to Lu et al. (2017), we consider some factors that might affect FDI 
inflows or the change in FDI regulations. 
5.1. Robustness tests – set 1 
Based on the existing literature, some other factors might influence and make these results 
biased. To tackle these problems, we conduct some more robustness tests to bear out our 
findings. 
Controlling for systematic changes. In DID specifications, there are potential systematic 
changes in the influence of controls on innovation after the switch of FDI regulations, which 
may coincide with the changes in FDI. To test whether our results are sensitive to this issue, 
we control for systematic changes in time-varying firm controls by estimating: 
 
0 02_fit it fit fit f t fitInnovation FDI Industry X Post Controls                 (3) 
Specifically, we further add the interactions between the dummy of Catalogue changing 
time and time-varying firm controls. The results in Table 11 Panel A suggest that the positive 
and statistically significant effects of FDI on firm innovation quantity and quality is unlikely 
driven by systematic changes from DID misspecification. 
Controlling for patent policy changes. Researchers have found that the increasing 
enforcement and protection of intellectual property rights contribute to the patent explosion in 
China (Hu and Jefferson, 2009; Ang et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2017). We manually collect 
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enforcement schedule of patent protection policy of each province in China (shown in 
Appendix Table A4). We include a dummy indicating the period after enforcement of patent 
protection policy (i.e., it equals 1 after enforcement and 0 otherwise) as an additional control. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 11 Panel B. We find that the impact of FDI on 
innovation quantity and quality is still positive and statistically significant. Also, the estimated 
coefficients of patent protection policy indicates that the increased protection of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) in China positively impacts innovation output, consistent with the 
findings in the literature that strengthening IPRs increases innovation in developing countries 
(Chen and Puttitanum, 2005). 
Controlling for high-tech zones. Tian and Xu (2018) demonstrate that the establishment 
of national high-tech zones has a positive effect on the innovation of local firms. We collect the 
establishment time of high-tech zones of each city and merge it with ASIF data. Similarly, we 
include a dummy indicating the period after establishment of the high-tech zone for the first 
time (i.e., it equals 1 after enforcement and equals 0 otherwise) as an additional control. The 
estimation results reported in Table 11 Panel C suggest that this additional control is statistically 
insignificant, while the coefficients of FDI remain robust. 
Controlling for subsidies. Some literature indicates that subsidies from Chinese 
government catalyze firms’ innovation (Howell, 2017; Fang et al., 2018). To control for this 
potential influence, we include subsidy level (the natural logarithm of one plus the subsidies 
amount) as a control to isolate the effect of FDI. The estimation results reported in Table 11 
Panel D show that the findings of baseline results remain robust. And results confirm the 
findings in the literature that the government subsidies do indeed boost firms’ innovation 
activities. 
Firm entry and exit. One might be concerned that the presence of FDI could crowd out 
firms with low innovation capability while increasing firms’ innovation quantity and quality 
on average. To address this concern, we use a sample in which all firms are present during the 
whole sample period to eliminate the potential influence of firm entry and exit. The estimation 
results reported in Table 11 Panel E show that with only such firms, the effects of FDI on 
innovation quantity and quality are still positive and statistically significant. 
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Two-way clustered standard errors. The standard errors in baseline regressions are 
clustered at firm-level. For robustness test, we cluster the standard errors at firm and industry-
year level, as our interest of regressor is an industry-level measurement and varies across years. 
The results in Table 11 Panel F suggest that our findings are not driven by a particular clustering 
level of standard errors. 
5.2. Robustness tests – set 2 
We conduct this set of robustness tests as in Lu et al. (2017), and the results are reported 
in Appendix Table A5. 
Exclusion of exports. The regressor of interest for our analysis, _ itFDI Industry   is 
constructed using firms’ total output. This could potentially overestimate the presence of FDI, 
as foreign multinationals export a large portion of their output. For the robustness test, we 
exclude the exports in the variable construction. The estimation results are reported in 
Appendix Table A5 Panel A. We continue to find positive and statistically significant effects of 
FDI on innovation quantity and quality, with the magnitudes becoming even larger. 
Composition of foreign multinationals. There are two types of FDI in China, wholly 
foreign-owned and joint ventures. The two forms of FDI may play different roles in affecting 
firm innovation in China. To address this issue, we control the percentage of wholly foreign-
owned multinationals in all foreign multinationals. The estimation results are reported in 
Appendix Table A5 Panel B, showing that the effects of FDI on innovation remain valid. 
Controlling for special economic zones. Due to policy preference or regional subsidies, 
the special economic zones are more likely to attract FDI. To address this issue, we control the 
percentage of industrial output from the special economic zones to isolate the effect of FDI. 
The estimation results reported in Appendix Table A5 Panel C show that the effects of FDI on 
the quantity and quality of firm innovation remain positive and statistically significant. 
However, the coefficients of additional control are all statistically insignificant. 
Alternative values of determinants. We include the interactions between year dummies 
and determinants of treatment selection 1998iZ  measured in 1998 to address the possible non-
random selection issue. However, using the determinants measured in 1998 is somewhat 
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arbitrary. Therefore, we also consider the determinants measured in 2002. The estimation 
results reported in Appendix Table A5 Panel D show that the results with the alternative 
measurements are consistent with the baseline results. 
Nonlinearity of the first-stage outcome. The fitted value of the first-stage outcome, 

itFDI_Industry , ranges from 0 to 1. We set the baseline regression model as linear, and employ 
the 2SLS estimation. There might be a concern that this could result in bias from 
misspecification. To address this concern, we employ the Logit model for the first-stage 
estimation to predict the fitted value. The estimation results are shown in Appendix Table A5 
Panel E. The results suggest that our findings of baseline regression are robust to nonlinearity 
of the first-stage regression. 
6. The Vertical Effects of FDI on Innovation  
FDI inflows may affect not only the innovation of firms within the same industry, but also 
the innovation of firms in the upstream or downstream industries. Javorcik (2004) demonstrates 
that the intra-industry effects of FDI are different from the inter-industry effect of FDI. We now 
turn to the vertical, or inter-industry, effects of FDI on Chinese firms. 
6.1. Vertical effects of FDI 
Following Javorcik (2004), we construct the domestic firm’s backward FDI and forward 
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where ktFDI_Sector  denotes the extent of FDI in sector k  and year t , sk  is the proportion of 
sector (two-digit CIC code) s  ’s output supplied to sector k  . Backward FDI captures the 
foreign presence in the sectors that are supplied by domestic firms in sector s . 























where sm  is the share of inputs purchased by sector s  from sector m . jtExport  is firm j ’s 
export in year t  ; 
jt jtOutput Export  is the size of firm j  ’s output for the domestic market. 
Forward FDI is a measure of the presence of FDI in upstream industries of sector s . Note that 
as only the intermediate inputs sold in domestic markets are relevant, the exports are excluded. 
The values of sk  and sm  are both taken from the 2002 input–output table. The instruments 
for backward
stFDI_Sector   and 
forward












  , respectively. 
The second-stage results of the 2SLS estimation are shown in Table 12 (The results of the 
first stage are reported in Appendix Table A6). The estimated coefficients in column (1) show 
that the effect of FDI on the number of all patents within the same sector remain significantly 
positive, consistent with our earlier finding. For the effects of vertical FDI, backward FDI 
shows a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of all patents, while forward 
FDI shows a negative and statistically significant effect. In column (2), we find the similar 
effects of horizontal and vertical FDI on the number of invention patents, though the effect of 
forward FDI is not statistically significant. In column (3), we also find that both the horizontal 
FDI and backward FDI have a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of 
patent citations, while the forward FDI has a negative and statistically significant effect. 
These results consistently show that the presence of FDI in the downstream sectors has 
positive effects on the innovation of upstream firms, which might take place through the 
backward linkages (i.e., contacts between foreign invested enterprises and local suppliers). Yet, 
the presence of FDI in the upstream sectors exerts negative effects on firms’ innovation, though 
the impact of forward FDI on the number of invention patents is insignificant. Next we examine 
potential backward and forward knowledge spillovers that may explain these vertical effects. 
6.2. Explaining the vertical effects: vertical knowledge spillovers 
There might be backward knowledge spillovers through contacts between foreign entrants 
and their local suppliers in the upstream industries or forward knowledge transfers through 
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contacts between foreign entrants and their local buyers in the downstream industries. To 
explore these possibilities, similar to the metrics of horizontal knowledge spillovers, we 
construct variables to measure backward and forward knowledge spillovers. Dependent 
variable   fitBackward Spillover Dummy  indicates whether a firm in industry i  cites the patent 
owned by firms from the downstream industries, and   fitBackward Spillover Intensity  indicates 
the ratio of citations citing patents from downstream firms to all citations. Similarly constructed 
are the   fitForward Spillover Dummy   and the   fitForward Spillover Intensity  . Columns (1) 
and (2) in Table 13 show positive and statistically significant knowledge spillovers from a 
downstream sector to its upstream domestic suppliers. This provides a plausible explanation 
for the positive effect of backward FDI on innovation. 
In columns (3) and (4), the coefficients of forward FDI are insignificant, though positive, 
suggesting a negligible knowledge spillover from foreign investment to domestic firms in the 
downstream industries. The presence of FDI in the upstream industries is likely to exert 
opposing effects on downstream firms’ innovations. On the one hand, upstream FIEs provide 
intermediate goods of more variety and higher quality at lower costs. This can reduce the 
pressure for downstream firms to innovate. On the other hand, downstream firms may benefit 
from upstream foreign suppliers by learning the technology embedded in the intermediate 
goods supplied by foreign investors. This type of knowledge spillover could promote the 
innovation of downstream firms. However, because we find no significant knowledge 
spillovers of forward FDI, it appears that the negative impact of forward FDI on innovation is 
due to the weakened incentive for the downstream firms to innovate when they could do well 
from the improvement of input supply even without innovation. Interestingly, Liu and Qiu 
(2016) also find that the inflows of intermediate goods with high quantity and quality reduce 
firms’ innovation in China. Notice that cheaper/better inputs from upstream foreign suppliers 
may have different impacts on productivity and innovation. The availability of high-quality 
inputs can clearly raise productivity, but it may reduce innovation incentives. This might 
explain the difference between our finding of the negative effect of forward FDI on innovation 




This paper has studied the impact of foreign direct investment inflows on the innovation 
of Chinese firms. Our analysis uses more comprehensive measures of innovation quantity and 
quality than those used in the literature and adopts a research design that enables us to identify 
the causal impact of FDI on innovation. We find that FDI has positive intra-industry effects on 
firms’ innovation in China and show that the positive effects are due to increased competition 
instead of knowledge spillover from FDI. We also find that FDI positively impacts innovation 
in upstream industries through backward vertical knowledge spillovers. 
The conventional wisdom is that knowledge spillovers from FDI facilitate the 
technological upgrading of firms in a developing country. Surprisingly, we find no significant 
positive effect on innovation from intra-industry knowledge spillover. This is in contrast to the 
result stated in the literature that FDI has a positive knowledge spillover effect on productivity. 
On the other hand, we find that FDI inflows intensify competition, and the increased 
competitive pressure leads to more innovation by domestic firms, contrary to findings in the 
literature that FDI has a negative competition effect on firm productivity. These results suggest 
that the effects of FDI on host-country firms are subtle, being rather different for innovation 
and for productivity. 
Innovation is a key driver of economic growth and prosperity. As developing countries 
raise technological capabilities and income levels, they will increasingly rely on innovation to 
achieve sustained economic growth and development. Many developing countries suffer from 
severe market imperfections and the lack of effective market competition. A broad lesson for 
developing countries from the experience in China is that attracting foreign direct investment 
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Figure 1 FDI and domestic patents (1985-2010) 
Data resource: FDI from World Development Indicators Database. Number of patents 
























Table 1 Summary statistics 
Firm-level variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Output 1,256,810 72.502 587.365 
Capital–labor ratio 1,256, 810 56.551 194.850 
Exporter status 1,256, 810 0.206 0.404 
SOE status 1,256, 810 0.087 0.281 
Number of all patents 1,256, 810 0.214 10.869 
Number of invention patents 1,256, 810 0.064 9.347 
Number of citations 1,256, 810 0.228 30.838 
Generality 1,256, 810 0.021 0.117 
Originality 1,256, 810 0.021 0.114 
Scaled number of all patents 1,256, 810 0.055 1.398 
Scaled number of invention patents 1,256, 810 0.014 0.789 
Scaled number of citations 1,256, 810 0.070 9.926 
Scaled generality 1,256, 810 0.037 0.352 




Table 2 Innovation quantity – all patents 
Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Poisson Reduced-form OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimation. Dependent variable: Log Allpatent Log Allpatent Log Allpatent Allpatent   
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 1.385**   
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.629)   
Panel B. First-stage estimation. Dependent variable: FDI industry FDI industry FDI industry FDI industry   
Treatment × Post02 0.184*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164***   
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)   
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2700.857 2134.102 2131.760 2131.760   
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1669.369 1301.328 1298.858 1298.858   
Panel C. Reduced-form and OLS estimation. Dependent variable:     Log Allpatent Log Allpatent 
Treatment × Post02     0.005***  
     (0.002)  
FDI industry      -0.0004 
      (0.0005) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product 
intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE 




Table 3 Innovation quantity – three categories of patent 
Model 2SLS Poisson 2SLS Poisson 2SLS Poisson 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Log Invention Invention Log Utility Utility Log Design Design 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.035*** 1.782*** -0.006 0.408 0.001 1.359 
 (0.005) (0.558) (0.006) (0.513) (0.006) (1.075) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in 
FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying 
firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Table 4 Innovation quality 
Model 2SLS Poisson 2SLS Poisson 2SLS Poisson 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Log Citation Citation Log Generality Generality Log Originality Originality 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.048*** 1.420** 0.022*** 0.314* 0.023*** 0.366** 
 (0.008) (0.575) (0.005) (0.177) (0.005) (0.180) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI 
regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm 




Table 5 Scaled index 
Model 2SLS 
















FDI industry (instrumented) 0.012** 0.017*** -0.005 -0.001 0.032*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Model Poisson 
















FDI industry (instrumented) 1.207** 1.677*** 0.418 1.011 1.550*** 0.082 0.102 
 (0.519) (0.396) (0.468) (0.772) (0.518) (0.287) (0.293) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI 
regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm 


























Generality of the 
best patent 
Originality of 
the best patent 
Breakthrough 
patent (top 5%) 
Breakthrough 





FDI industry (instrumented) 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number 
of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 Product market competition effect 




Log Allpatent Log Invention Log Citation 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.008*** -0.044*** -0.008 -0.025* 
 (0.001) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) 
Product market competition  -0.043 0.043** 0.042 
  (0.040) (0.021) (0.034) 
FDI industry × Product market 
competition (instrumented) 
 0.077*** 0.045*** 0.076*** 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: The interaction term between industry-level FDI and product market competition is instrumented with the 
interaction between FDI regulation change and product market competition. A constant term is included but not 
reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI regulations 
include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. 
Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * 





Table 8 Technology market competition effect 




Log Allpatent Log Invention Log Citation 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.159*** 0.070* 0.061* 0.116* 
 (0.010) (0.041) (0.031) (0.062) 
Technology market competition  -1.243** -0.941** -1.955** 
  (0.529) (0.415) (0.813) 
FDI industry × Technology market 
competition (instrumented) 
 2.305*** 1.808*** 3.544*** 
 (0.723) (0.567) (1.110) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: The interaction term between industry-level FDI and technology market competition is instrumented with 
the interaction between FDI regulation change and technology market competition. A constant term is included but 
not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI 
regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level 
in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** 




Table 9 Horizontal spillover effect 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Horizontal Spillover Dummy Horizontal Spillover Intensity 
FDI industry (instrumented) -0.00055 -0.00019 
 (0.00066) (0.00043) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. 
Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of 
firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-
labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 10 Heterogeneity effects 
Dependent variable: Log Allpatent Log Invention Log Citation 
Panel A. Firm size (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.092*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) 
Size 0.250*** 0.166*** 0.226*** 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.021) 
FDI industry × Size (instrumented) -0.252*** -0.176*** -0.238*** 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.022) 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel B. SOE (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.057*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) 
SOE 0.053* 0.062*** 0.110*** 
 (0.030) (0.017) (0.029) 
FDI industry × SOE (instrumented) -0.072** -0.077*** -0.137*** 
 (0.035) (0.020) (0.034) 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel C. Alliance with foreign capital (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.054*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) 
Alliance 0.119** 0.124*** 0.168*** 
 (0.058) (0.038) (0.060) 
FDI industry × Alliance (instrumented) -0.097** -0.101*** -0.135*** 
 (0.044) (0.028) (0.045) 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel D. Technological distance (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.055*** 0.073*** 0.095*** 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) 
Technological distance 0.046** 0.081*** 0.100*** 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.023) 
FDI industry × Technological distance (instrumented) -0.065** -0.119*** -0.146*** 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.035) 
Observations 1,206,400 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The interaction term in each panel is instrumented with the interaction between FDI regulation change and 
the corresponding firm's characteristic. A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, 
number of firms, and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls 
include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 11 Robustness tests 
Dependent variable Log Allpatent Log Invention Log Citation 
Panel A: Control for systematic changes (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2131.760 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1298.858 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel B: Control for PPP (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
PPP 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2131.547 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1298.761 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel C: Control for high-tech zones (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
HTZ 0.012 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2131.859 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1299.320 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel D: Control for subsidies (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.047*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
Subsidies 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2126.801 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1295.425 
Observations 1,255,792 
Panel E: Sample of long-standing firms (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.077*** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 935.702 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 798.342 
Observations 179,804 
Panel F: Two-way clustered standard errors (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.030** 0.035*** 0.048*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
Observations 1,256,810 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. 
Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of 
firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-
labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
 
43 








Dependent variable: Log Allpatent Log Invention Log Citation 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Backward FDI (instrumented) 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) 
Forward FDI (instrumented) -0.099*** -0.019 -0.038* 
 (0.026) (0.012) (0.019) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, 
and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include 
firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 13 Vertical spillover effect 














Backward FDI (instrumented) 0.00001** 0.00006***   
 (0.00000) (0.00001)   
Forward FDI (instrumented)   0.00015 0.00012 
   (0.00055) (0.00041) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 1,256,810 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by firm. Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, 
and average age of firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include 
firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 





Table A1 Determinants of changes in FDI regulations (industry level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Changes in FDI 
regulations 
Changes in FDI 
regulations 
Changes in FDI 
regulations 
Changes in FDI 
regulations 
New product intensity 1.684*** 1.678*** 1.542*** 1.585*** 
 (0.311) (0.330) (0.345) (0.339) 
Export intensity -0.039 -0.038 -0.004 -0.013 
 (0.184) (0.184) (0.183) (0.183) 
Number of firms 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Ellison-Glaeser index 0.316 0.315 0.302 0.288 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.251) (0.255) 
Average age of firms -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log average employment 0.061 0.061 0.046 0.053 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) 
Log average wage per worker -0.051 -0.051 -0.067 -0.070 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.115) (0.115) 
Number of all patents  0.006   
  (0.070)   
Number of invention patents   2.521  
   (1.749)  
Number of citations    0.727 
    (0.575) 
Constant -0.014 -0.014 0.084 0.055 
 (0.344) (0.345) (0.342) (0.339) 
R2 0.112 0.112 0.119 0.116 
Observations 422 422 422 422 
Note: Observations are at the four-digit industry level. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by 
industry. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A2 Competition effects – first-stage estimation results 
Panel A. Product market competition (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: FDI industry 
FDI industry × Product market 
competition 
Treatment × Post02 2.503*** -0.065 
 (0.304) (0.156) 




Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 1190.190 
766.933 
1,256,810 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 
Observations 
Panel B. Technology market competition (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: FDI industry 
FDI industry × Technology 
market competition 
Treatment × Post02 0.164*** -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.002) 




Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 974.426 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 37.464 
Observations 1,256,810 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. 
Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at 
the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, 




Table A3 Heterogeneity – first-stage estimation results 
Panel A. Firm size (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: FDI industry FDI industry × Size 
Treatment × Post02 0.169*** 0.066*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
Treatment × Post02 × Size -0.026*** -0.172*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 1058.060 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 666.939 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel B. SOE (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: FDI industry FDI industry × SOE 
Treatment × Post02 0.164*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
Treatment × Post02 × SOE -0.004 -0.142*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 1007.450 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 508.890 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel C. Alliance (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: FDI industry FDI industry × Alliance 
Treatment × Post02 0.165*** 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
Treatment × Post02 × Alliance -0.123*** -0.304*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 1032.861 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 643.280 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel D. Technological distance (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: FDI industry 
FDI industry × Technological 
distance 
Treatment × Post02 0.240*** 0.140*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Treatment × Post02 × Technological distance -0.201*** -0.238*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 978.453 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 583.367 
Observations 1,206,400 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. 
Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at 
the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, 





Table A4 Patent protection policy 
Year Province 
1996 Guangdong 
1997 Hebei, Sichuan 
1998 Shandong, Hubei, Anhui 
1999 Liaoning, Zhejiang, Guangxi 
2001 Henan, Hunan 
2002 Shanxi, Shanghai 
2003 Ningxia, Guizhou 
2004 Shaanxi, Gansu, Heilongjiang, Yunnan, Fujian, Xinjiang 
2005 Beijing 
2007 Chongqing 
After 2007 Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Tianjin 
No policy Jilin, Neimenggu, Hainan, Xizang 
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Table A5 Robustness tests 
Dependent variable Log Allpatent Log Invention Log Citation 
Panel A: Exclusion of exports (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2669.402 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1398.350 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel B: Composition of foreign multinationals (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) 
Share of wholly-owned FIE 0.005 0.012*** 0.017*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 1849.425 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1123.241 
Observations 1,255,799 
Panel C: Control for special economic zones (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.047*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
Share of output of SEZ 0.013 0.003 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.015) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2540.151 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1390.949 
Observations 1,123,952 
Panel D: Alternative values of determinants (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.018** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 2437.048 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1618.218 
Observations 1,256,810 
Panel E: Nonlinearity of first-stage estimation (1) (2) (3) 
FDI industry (instrumented) 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 1,256,810 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. 
Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of 
firms at the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-
labor ratio, and SOE dummy. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A6 Horizontal and vertical FDI – first-stage estimation results 
Horizontal and vertical FDI 
(1) (2) (3) 
Horizontal FDI Backward FDI Forward FDI 
Treatment × Post02 0.708*** -0.074 -0.039*** 
 (0.007) (0.070) (0.001) α  Treatment × Post02 0.006*** -0.823*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) β  Treatment × Post02 -0.095*** -0.989*** -0.174*** 
 (0.006) (0.097) (0.002) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 8675.223 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 3324.412 
Observations 1,256,810 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FDI determinants × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
SOE privatization × year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time-varying firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
Note: A constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. 
Determinants of changes in FDI regulations include new product intensity, number of firms, and average age of firms at 
the four-digit industry level in 1998. Time-varying firm controls include firm output, export status, capital-labor ratio, 




Based on the matching methodology put forward by He et al. (2018), our matching project 
steps are as followings: 
Step1. Extracting patent data 
In order to improve matching efficiency, we remove patents with the following 
characteristics: (1) Patents with application date outside the period of 1998-2007; (2) Patents 
assigned to individuals; (3) Patents assigned to foreign firms with an address in a foreign 
country. 
Step2. Get full name 
A set of pre-processing routines are implemented to deal with patent assignee names and 
ASIF firm names to get standardize “full name”: 
(1) Trim all symbols and punctuation marks that are not letters, characters, or numbers. 
These include hyphen, parentheses, apostrophe, comma, bar mark, etc. We remove both half-
width and full-width symbols such as & and ＆, and both half-width and full-width punctuation 
marks such as ? and ？. 
(2) Convert all full-width letters into half-width ones. For example, convert Ｂ into B, Ｃ 
into C. 
(3) Convert Chinese numbers into Arabic numbers. Specifically, convert (０, １, ２ , …,
９) and (零或〇, 一, 二, …, 九) into (0, 1, 2, …, 9). 
Step3. Get short name 
Remove various designators of corporate form to obtain the so-called “short names”. A 
set of such designators is the so-called stemming list, which includes: (1) Affix words: 股份有
限责任公司, 股份有限公司, 有限责任公司, 独立行政法人, 有限总公司, 有限分公司, 总
公司, 分公司, 董事会, 集团, 有限公司, 有限责任, 株式会社, 公司, 股份, 企业, 工厂, 厂; 
(2) Address words: 省, 市, 自治区, 县, 镇, 乡, 村. 
Step4. Exact matching 
(1) Exact matching based on full name. We consider it is an exact matching pair if the full 




(2) Exact matching based on the short name. Similarly, we consider it is an exact matching 
pair if the short name of ASIF firm and the short name of patent assignee are identified a pair 
of the identical short name. However, in this case, some pairs are not exactly the same. We 
manually check each pair of exact matching based on the short name after automatically 
computing matching to confirm whether it is a pair of identical firms. For example, we regard 
东风汽车股份有限公司 and 东风汽车公司 are the identical firm, while 安阳县钢铁厂 and 
安阳钢铁集团有限责任公司 are not the identical firm although they have the identical short 
name. 
Step5. Approximate matching 
Our approximate matching divides the rest observations into two samples: 
(1) Name containing sample: short name of ASIF firm contains the short name of patent 
assignee, or short name of patent assignee contains the short name of ASIF firm. It is more 
likely to find an identical pair in this sample. We manually check these observations to identify 
pairs of identical firms. For example, 江苏好孩子集团 and 好孩子集团 are regarded as the 
same firm. 
(2) Name not containing sample: To conduct this work, we adopt the Levenshtein method. 
Levenshtein distance (Levenshtein, 1966)1 solves the following problem: given two names, 
how to convert one name into the other with the minimum cost of a sequence of editing steps 
including character insertion, character deletion, character substitution, and transposition of 
two adjacent characters, each of which has a nonnegative cost. To calculate the Levenshtein 
distance, one has to assign a cost to each edit operation. Based on the Levenshtein distance, we 
define the Levenshtein similarity between two names X  and Y  as follows: 
  1  1 / x yName Similarity Levenshtein Distance d N N      
where d  is the number of edits needed to transform one name into the other, xN  is the length 
of name X , and 
yN  is the length of name Y . 
 




We set the threshold at 0.75 based on prior work. Towards this part of observations, we 
carry out manual checks to identify pairs of identical firms. In total, 476,942 patents are 
matched up to ASIF data. Detailed specification is in Appendix Table B1. 
 
Table B1 Matching result 
Year Invention Utility Design Total 
1998 741 3,275 5,645 9,661 
1999 1,112 4,344 7,606 13,062 
2000 1,785 5,482 8,891 16,158 
2001 2,876 7,021 10,145 20,042 
2002 6,691 10,510 13,664 30,865 
2003 11,679 14,342 15,114 41,135 
2004 16,752 18,979 21,714 57,445 
2005 23,853 23,092 25,277 72,222 
2006 33,797 30,832 31,184 95,813 
2007 44,992 39,603 35,944 120,539 





First, we compare the 1997 and 2002 versions of the Catalogue for the Guidance of 
Foreign Investment Industries. According to the changes in the FDI policies for each product. 
we classify each product into one of four possible outcomes: 
(1) FDI became more welcome. For example, fruit and vegetable beverage, protein 
beverage, and coffee beverage were listed in the supported category in 2002, while in the 
permitted category in 1997. We designate these products as FDI encouraged products. 
(2) FDI became less welcome. For example, Hepatitis B diagnostic reagent, and Hepatitis 
C diagnostic reagent were listed in the permitted category in 2002, while in the encouraged 
category in 1997. We designate these products as FDI discourage products. 
(3) No change in FDI regulation. For example, styrene butadiene rubber was listed in the 
permitted category in both 1997 and 2002. We designate this product as the FDI no change 
product. 
Second, we aggregate the changes in FDI regulations from the product level to the industry 
level. It is worth noting that the product classifications of the Catalogue are generally more 
disaggregated than the four-digit CIC industry classifications. Thus, two or more products from 
the Catalogue may be sorted into the same four-digit CIC industry. According to this 
aggregation process, all the four-digit CIC industries are classified into four categories: 
(1) FDI encouraged industry. For all the possible Catalogue products in a four-digit CIC 
industry, there was either an improvement in FDI regulations or no change in FDI regulations. 
For example, two products tea beverage (CIC sub-code: 15390100) and coffee beverage (CIC 
sub-code: 15399901) in Tea and Other Beverages Manufacturing Industry (CIC code: 1539) 
experienced an improvement in FDI regulations (listed in the supported category in 2002, while 
in the permitted category in 1997), and there was no change in FDI regulations for other 
products in this industry. We designate Tea and Other Beverages Manufacturing Industry as an 
FDI encouraged industry. 
(2) FDI discouraged industry. For all of the possible Catalogue products in a four-digit 
CIC industry, there was either a deterioration in FDI regulations or no change in FDI 
regulations. For example, two products monocrystalline silicon (CIC sub-code: 26650202) and 
polycrystalline silicon (CIC sub-code: 26650203) in Information Chemical Manufacturing 
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Industry (CIC code: 2665) experienced a deterioration in FDI regulations (listed in the 
permitted category in 2002, while in the supported category in 1997), and there was no change 
in FDI regulations for other products in this industry. We designate Information Chemical 
Manufacturing Industry as an FDI discouraged industry. 
(3) FDI no change industries: There was no change in FDI regulations for any of the 
possible Catalogue products under a four-digit CIC industry. For example, there was no change 
in FDI regulations for all products in Metal Structure Manufacturing Industry (CIC code: 3411). 
We designate Metal Structure Manufacturing Industry as an FDI no change industry. 
(4) Mixed industry: Some of the possible Catalogue products in a four-digit CIC industry 
experienced an improvement in FDI regulations, but some other products worsened in FDI 
regulations. For example, in Auto Parts and Accessories Manufacturing Industry (CIC code: 
3725), two products vehicle radiator (CIC sub-code: 37250108) and airbag device (CIC sub-
code: 37250203) experienced an improvement in regulations (listed in the supported category 
in 2002, while in the restricted category in 1997), but window lifter (CIC sub-code: 37250204) 
experienced a deterioration in FDI regulations (listed in the permitted category in 2002, while 
in the supported category in 1997). We designate Auto Parts and Accessories Manufacturing 
Industry as an FDI mixed industry. 
 
